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PRESIDENT REAGAN  unveiled a set of proposals in February 1982 for 
fundamentally  altering  U.S. federal-state  fiscal relations. He first pro- 
posed a massive program "swap" whereby the federal government 
would take over sole responsibility  for the large and rapidly  growing 
medicaid  program  and the states would assume sole responsibility  for 
the main  U. S. income  support  programs-food stamps  and  aid  to families 
with dependent children (AFDC). He also proposed various ways to 
loosen strings  heretofore  accompanying  categorical  grants-many grants 
would be converted from categorical  to block-grant  form (continuing  a 
trend begun a decade earlier in the Nixon administration),  and many 
categorical  and block grants  would then be placed in a trust fund, the 
financial  responsibility  for which would eventually  revert  to state gov- 
ernments. Finally, he proposed rather sharp cutbacks in all forms of 
intergovernmental  aid, cutbacks  that  would  normally  be front  page  news 
but  in fact were upstaged  by the more  fundamental  structural  proposals. 
In this paper  I try to construct  an analytical  framework  for evaluating 
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these proposals. Their details have been debated extensively since 
February,  and there seems little point in rehashing  this debate.  ' But the 
president's  proposals  do raise some deeper  philosophical  and  empirical 
issues regarding  the structure  of both income-support  programs  and 
categorical  grants, and these issues have until now received relatively 
little discussion. The paper  is an attempt  to fill  that  void. 
I begin with an analysis of the most central, and interesting,  issue- 
whether responsibility  for income-maintenance  programs  should rest 
with the states as President Reagan has proposed; with the federal 
government  as many,  including  previous  presidents,  the Advisory  Com- 
mission on Intergovernmental  Relations, and David Stockman have 
proposed;  or whether  income-maintenance  should  continue  as a shared 
responsibility.2  This normative discussion highlights  the critical role 
played by some key state behavioral  response parameters  and leads to 
the development of  an empirical model aimed at estimating these 
parameters.  The parameters  also permit  a simulation  of the impacts of 
the president's "new federalism"  proposals  on levels of income main- 
tenance throughout  the country. 
I then address  the other  side of the question,  the impact  of categorical 
grants, block grants, fund cutbacks, and the like on state budgets. I 
adopt a model used previously in BPEA,  but tailor it to analyze the 
president's  new proposals.3 
1. The proposal  is described  in Office  of Management  and  Budget,  Major  Themes  and 
Additional  Budget  Details,  Fiscal  Year' 1983 (Government  Printing Office,  1982). An 
updated  version  is OMB, "Tentative  Administration  Decisions  on Federalism  Initiative" 
(June  22, 1982).  A critical  analysis  can be found  in Edward  M. Gramlich  and  Deborah  S. 
Laren, "The New Federalism,"  in Joseph  A. Pechman,  ed., Setting  National  Priorities: 
The  1983  Budget  (Brookings  Institution,  1982),  pp. 151-86. 
2. Federalizing  public assistance has been an important  component  of the welfare 
reform  plans proposed  by both Presidents  Nixon and Carter.  In June 1980  the Advisory 
Commission  on Intergovernmental  Relations  singled  out income maintenance  and food 
stamps  as programs  that should be operated  at the federal  level. David A. Stockman's 
views on the matter  were stated, somewhat  vaguely,  in "The  Social  Pork  Barrel,"  Public 
Interest, vol. 39 (Spring 1975), pp. 3-30. One of the clearest statements  in favor of 
nationalization  of income  maintenance  by an economist  can  be found  in Wallace  E. Oates, 
Fiscal Federalism  (Harcourt,  Brace, Jovanovich, 1972),  chap. 1. Oates has not changed 
his view since  his  book  was written;  see his "The  New Federalism:  An Economist's  View" 
(University of Maryland, 1982). A theoretical paper that analyzes various subcases, 
sometimes  arriving  at different  conclusions,  is by Mark  V. Pauly,  "Income  Redistribution 
as a Local  Public  Good," Journal  of Public  Economics,  vol. 2 (February  1973),  pp. 35-58. 
3. The model follows, without too much change, that in Edward  M. Gramlich  and 
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The Federal Role in Income Maintenance 
In a democracy  it is natural  to assume  that  the level of income  support 
should  be determined  by the voters. However, the question  of whether 
income-support  programs  should  be determined  at the national  or state 
level, or as a shared  responsibility,  has no easy answer.  Since voters are 
at the same time citizens of the national  and  a state  government,  they or 
their  representatives  cannot  simultaneously  set one level of benefits  that 
obtains throughout  the nation and another level within a state. Two 
arguments  are usually made for determining  benefits at the national 
level. One is the claim, which can be posed in public  choice terms, that 
voters feel a responsibility  for supporting  beneficiaries  throughout  the 
country  at certain  minimal  living  standards.  It might  be felt, for  instance, 
that especially insofar  as children  and young families  are concerned, a 
certain  level of income support  is a basic national  right  of beneficiaries.4 
If particular  states choose not to provide such minimum  support,  there 
is a psychic externality  to voters in other states, hence national  actions 
to constrain  state choices are  justified. 
A second argument  for granting  the national  government  priority  in 
the setting of AFDC benefits rests on the possibility for migration.  If 
state legislators perceive that AFDC beneficiaries  will immigrate  to 
states with relatively high benefits, and taxpayers will emigrate  from 
states with relatively  high taxes, they will keep benefits  below the level 
that  would  otherwise  maximize  the collective  welfare  of a state's  existing 
residents. This tendency exists even if all states have identical  prefer- 
ences about income support.5  The immigration  flows cannot  be limited 
1:1973, pp. 15-58; it was later simplified  and modified  in Gramlich,  "State and Local 
Budgets  the Day After  It Rained:  Why Is the Surplus  So High?"  BPEA, 1:1978,  pp. 191- 
214. 
4. The first  claim is proposed  most clearly in Helen F. Ladd  and Fred C. Doolittle, 
"Which  Level of Government  Should  Assist the Poor?" National Tax  Journal,  vol. 35 
(September  1982), pp. 323-36. They also cite a poll by the Advisory Commission  on 
Intergovernmental  Relations  suggesting  that most respondents  view income  support  as a 
national  responsibility.  The latter claim is argued in Arthur  M. Okun, Equality and 
Efficiency:  The  Big Tradeoff  (Brookings  Institution,  1975),  chaps. 1 and  4. 
5. In fact, as Pauly points out, the normative  implications  of migration  can be quite 
complicated.  When  the migration  is that  of positive  taxpayers,  it is difficult  to tell a priori 
whether  redistribution  policy should  be made  at the national  or state (or local)  level. But 
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by residency  requirements,  which are now considered  unconstitutional 
by the Supreme  Court.6 
Is it possible  to structure  a scheme  that  satisfies  this second  argument, 
provides  at  least some minimum  support  defined  by national  preferences, 
and also allows scope for differences  in preferences  among states? At 
least three ways for structuring  state and national  responsibilities  have 
been put  forth.  One, advanced  by Tresch,  is a hierarchical  redistribution 
system.7 Under this plan, the national  government  would redistribute 
income among states, the states among localities, and the localities 
among households. Legislators could vote for as much or as little 
redistribution  as they wanted  at each level of government.  Migration  or 
the anticipation  of it would not distort  the pattern  of benefits  in such a 
system because a generous  locality  would  be entitled  to greater  transfers 
from higher  levels of government  if low-income  families moved into it 
and high-income taxpayers moved out. If migration  were costless, 
impoverished individuals in localities providing inadequate benefits 
could  move and  their  doing  so would  not add  to the burden  of the locality 
to which they moved. But if migration  were costly, such a system would 
work little better than a decentralized  system in which only states set 
benefit  levels: there  would  be no way for  legislators  representing  national 
preferences to ensure that low-income people were taken care of in 
particular  states. Moreover, even if migration  were not costly and the 
system worked  as it should, the outcome might  not be socially desirable 
because the scheme could in the long run  lead to extreme  differences  in 
state and  local incomes. 
A second possible approach  follows similar  proposals  in education. 
States could decide on benefit levels, but in the presence of federal 
"power equalization"  grants  that neutralize  the impact  of state income 
in determining  these benefit  levels. Hence public  assistance  beneficiaries 
in low-income states would, apart  from preference  (nonincome)  differ- 
argument  given here  is usually  correct:  redistribution  should  be done at the national  level, 
or national  tastes should  take priority.  See Pauly, "Income  Redistribution." 
6. In 1969,  the Court  held  that  residency  requirements  are  unconstitutional  restrictions 
on free interstate travel and that such laws constitute "invidious discrimination"  in 
distinguishing  between  poor  persons  who are  long-term  residents  of a state  and  those who 
are not. This decision could be reexamined  at any point:  some states have recently  tried 
to adopt  residency  requirements  that  are yet to be challenged. 
7.  See Richard W. Tresch,  Public Finance:  A Normative  Theory (Business  Publica- 
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ences, be supported  at the same expected level as those in high-income 
states. Such  a scheme  would  consist of a matching  grant  AFDC  program, 
with matching  rates inversely correlated  with state income. Feldstein 
has shown how state matching  rates can be computed so as to make 
expected AFDC benefit levels independent  of state income.8  Assume 
that AFDC benefits are determined  by a log-linear  demand  function  of 
the form 
(1)  B  =  coectZYC2P-C3 
where  B is the AFDC benefit  level in a state; Y,  average  state per capita 
income; PB,  the effective price of benefits to the state per dollar (or, 
equivalently,  the state's share);  andZ, some  preference  variable  assumed 
to be uncorrelated  with income. If the relevant  elasticities are constant 
among  states in the way specified, and the federal  grant  is open-ended, 
authorities  can offset income differences  by making  the federal share, 
m, itself depend  on income. In particular,  if 
(2)  PB = (1m)=  C4 c5, 
then 
a ln  B 
(3)  a In  C2  C3C5' 
Thus  if the federal  authorities  set C5  =  C2/C3, expected state  benefit  levels 
are made independent  of state income. The level of C4 determines  the 
average level of benefits. The higher is the income elasticity, c2, the 
more B is likely to be high in high-income  states, and the more this 
tendency would need to be offset by a generous matching  formula  for 
low-income  states. Conversely,  the greater  in absolute  value  is the price 
elasticity, C3, the less reason there  is for a generous  matching  rate. 
But even though an open-ended grant of this sort will reduce or 
eliminate the income-generated  disparity  in income-support  levels, it 
will not eliminate  the disparity  caused by other preference  differences 
among  states. The preference  for redistribution  may vary  widely across 
states, and, if it does, benefit levels will also vary widely, even with 
power  equalization.  Voters might  want  a higher  level of income support 
in a particular  state and be unable  to bring  it about. 
8. Martin  S. Feldstein, "Wealth  Neutrality  and Local Choice in Public  Education," 
American Economic Review,  vol. 65 (March  1975),  pp. 75-89. 332  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
A different  grant policy variant could potentially have a stronger 
effect in reducing  the statewide variation  in benefits. If matching  rates 
depended not on the independent  variable, Y, but on the dependent 
variable,  B, the budget  line facing states would  not be linear  but convex 
(or  piecewise linear).  The federal  government  could match  a high share 
of the first  XI dollars in AFDC benefits, a lower share of the next X2 
dollars, and so forth. The price incentives in such a scheme could be 
chosen so as to make states cluster  around  the desired  level of benefits, 
hence reducing  the statewide  variance  in benefits.  If the matching  rates 
were in addition  made to depend on state income, the virtues of both 
approaches  could be combined. 
A third broad approach is the more straightforward  one of state 
supplementation.  Under this approach  the national  government  would 
set a basic guarantee  level for the nation. States could then choose to 
supplement  this guarantee  or not. To preserve the national  priority,  it 
must not be possible for the states to "tax away" the national  benefits 
by reducing  their  own benefits.  But while this scheme does establish  the 
basic guarantee  level consistent with national  preferences,  it does not 
necessarily  result in state supplemental  benefits  that reflect  the desires 
of voters in states choosing to supplement the national floor. State 
supplementation  levels could still be kept down by fear of migration. 
It is also possible to combine  the second and  third  approaches-state 
supplementation  with power equalization. Under this scheme there 
would be a basic national  benefit  level that could not be taxed away by 
states. States would be empowered  to supplement  this national  benefit 
level to the extent desired.  Matching  federal  grants  would  make  expected 
state supplementation  levels independent of state income by power 
equalization. The national floor avoids the main criticism of a pure 
power-equalization  scheme with an open-ended grant. The power- 
equalization  grant  eliminates  income as a source of disparity  in supple- 
mental benefits and would reduce the importance  of migration  fears. 
And convexities in the grant schedule could reduce disparities  even 
more. 
The present system can be likened to this hybrid scheme and has 
many  of its virtues. The basic national  benefit  level can be thought  of as 
food stamps, a national  program  available  to most low-income  families 
with a basic level of support  ($233  a month  for a family  of four in 1981). 
In addition to this, all states supplement food stamps with AFDC Edward M.  Gramlich  333 
payments,  which  are  available  to low-income  families  with  female  heads 
of household  and (in twenty-six states) families  with unemployed  male 
heads.9  For most of these ranges AFDC payments  are financed  by an 
open-ended  federal matching  grant with state shares (1 -  m) varying 
between 22 and 50 percent, depending  on state income. For very low 
benefit  levels, there  is even a convex grant  schedule,  with  the state share 
being  just 17  percent  for the first  $72 per month  for a family  of four and 
a higher amount that depends on state income for the next $56 per 
month.  '0 
But although  in its general structure  the current  system can accom- 
modate  national  and state preferences  without  the major  disadvantages 
of many other schemes, how it actually works depends on some key 
behavioral  parameters.  One factor is that states may appear  to supple- 
ment  food stamps,  but  in fact respond  to food stamp  guarantee  increases 
by reducing their AFDC benefits dollar for dollar. If so, the national 
benefit floor is less effective at the margin  than it seems: within some 
range,  it may  prove  impossible  for  national  legislators  to alter  nationwide 
minimum  benefits by changing  food stamp guarantee  levels. Another 
factor is that the matching  grant structure  may be less than ideal. The 
state matching shares may not be well correlated  with the Feldstein 
neutral  values given by equation  3 above. If so, expected supplementa- 
tion levels are not independent  of state income. And even if they are, 
the impact of preferences or other independent  variables could still 
cause such a wide variation  in actual supplementation  levels that the 
national  priority  in setting income-support  benefits could not be effec- 
9. A similar  program  structure  is in place  for the aged, blind,  and  disabled.  The basic 
national  floor  is called Supplemental  Security  Income, which  now pays $426  a month  for 
a couple with no other income. All states except Texas also provide supplementary 
benefits,  though  without  the advantage  of federal  matching  shares. 
10. This convex schedule was a feature  of the original  AFDC law, passed as part  of 
the Social Security  Act of 1935.  Although  the convex schedule  could greatly  reduce  the 
statewide  variation  in benefits,  it has been allowed  to wither  away  by the combined  effect 
of inflation  (the kink  points have not been indexed  and  thus have declined  enormously  in 
real  terms  over the years)  and  the introduction  of medicaid  in 1965.  The  medicaid  law  gave 
states the option of being reimbursed  by their  medicaid  formula,  an open-ended  federal 
grant  with state shares  depending  on income and varying  between  22 and  50 percent,  as 
stated in the text. By now, all but two states have switched to the medicaid  formula: 
Arizona,  which does not have medicaid  (though  it soon will), and Texas, where AFDC 
benefits  are actually  limited  in the state constitution  to a level at which the old convex 
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tively established  without  a convex grant  schedule.  A third  factor  is that 
the optimality  of any set of state supplementation  benefits  depends on 
the strength  of migration  perceptions. If migration  of potential  benefi- 
ciaries is perceived to be highly sensitive to rises in benefit  levels, or if 
states are influenced by benefits in neighboring  states for any other 
reason, these states are thrown  off their "closed economy" preferred 
support  levels, and the appearance  that state supplementation  levels 
satisfy state choices is again hollow. The remedy for each of these 
problems would be a more centralized system, with higher national 
benefit levels and less reliance on state supplementation-exactly the 
reverse  of what the president  is now proposing. 
A Model of the Determination  of AFDC Benefit Levels 
The foregoing discussion shows that empirical  estimates of critical 
behavioral  response parameters  are necessary to evaluate the present 
income-support  system and any proposals  for reforming  it. There  have 
been previous attempts at explaining  AFDC benefit levels, but none 
focuses on all these key behavioral  parameters.  In this section, I develop 
a model of state determination  of AFDC benefits  that  has such a focus. 
A first  question  in building  any model  of the determination  of AFDC- 
support  levels is why public  assistance  benefits  are  paid  at all. Essentially 
four  political-economic  models have been proposed  in the literature:  (1) 
the altruism  model of Orr,  Pauly, and others,11  in which voters support 
welfare  benefits  because they want  to raise living standards  of the poor, 
balancing  the marginal  gain in terms of the utility from higher  benefits 
with the marginal  cost in terms of private  goods that are sacrificed;  (2) 
the vote-buying  model of Peltzman and others,'2 whereby politicians 
raise AFDC benefits because they are buying votes from their low- 
11. Larry  L. Orr, "Income Transfers  as a Public  Good:  An Application  to AFDC," 
American  Economic  Review,  vol.  66  (June  1976),  pp.  359-71;  and  Pauly,  "Income 
Redistribution."  The spirit  of Orr's  model  follows that  of income-transfer  models  devel- 
oped earlier  by many authors  (cited in his paper),  but Orr  has developed  the empirical 
model  that  best fits prevailing  U.S. federalism  conventions. 
12. Sam Peltzman,  "The Growth  of Government,"  Journal  of Law and Economics, 
vol. 23 (October  1980),  pp. 209-87. A model  in the same  tradition  is Allan  H. Meltzer  and 
Scott 0.  Richard,  "Why Government  Grows  (and  Grows)  in a Democracy,"  The  Public 
Interest,  vol. 52 (Summer  1978),  pp. 111-18. Edward  M. Gramlich  335 
income constituents,  expanding  the program  until  the marginal  political 
gain among potential beneficiaries equals the marginal  political loss 
among  potential  taxpayers;  (3) the income-security  model of Varian,'3 
in which voters favor income-support  programs  not to help others, but 
to limit  the variation  in their  own income  in a world  of uncertainty  about 
their income; and (4) the regulation  model of Piven and Cloward,'4  in 
which AFDC is used as a device to maintain  civil order  by controlling 
the poor, adding them to the welfare rolls in periods when disorder 
threatens  and  removing  them  from  the rolls when its threat  subsides. 
These models are not mutually  exclusive, and  there  is no reason  why 
AFDC  benefits  cannot  be paid  to satisfy  a variety  of objectives. In many 
cases the empirical  formulation  of each model  will look quite  similar,  so 
that  it is difficult  for real world  tests to discriminate  among  the models. 
But there are a few cases in which the models would imply quite 
different  behavior. One has to do with income in the state. Under the 
altruism  model, as taxpayers  become more  affluent,  they should  want  to 
consume  more of a range  of public  and  private  goods, including  income- 
support  levels. Under the vote-buying  model, the sign of income may 
well be reversed, as a rise in income could indicate  fewer votes to be 
bought  by pandering  to those with lower incomes. Under the security 
model, the same could be true, as fewer voters may fear that drops in 
income would bring  them under  AFDC standards.  Similarly,  according 
to the regulation  model, higher  incomes imply fewer poor people and 
therefore  fewer people needing  control. 
A similar difference could exist with migration  incentives. In the 
altruism  model, for a given level of benefits in surrounding  states, the 
higher the cost of raising benefits is, the lower are predicted benefit 
levels in a particular  state. But under  the vote-buying  model, a rise in 
benefits could be an attempt to buy voters from outside the state by 
attracting  migrating  AFDC beneficiaries,  hence raising  the net gain to 
politicians  and raising  benefit  levels. So it goes. 
13. Hal R. Varian,  "Redistributive  Taxation  as Social Insurance,"  Journal  of Public 
Economics,  vol. 14  (August  1980),  pp. 49-68. 
14.  Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating  the Poor: The Functions 
of Public Welfare  (Pantheon  Books, 1971).  They too have not changed  their view, and 
indeed  have  a recent  book  explaining  Reagan's  attempted  cuts  in social  programs  (of  which 
the new federalism  is one aspect) by the fact that the explicit threat  of civil disorder  is 
subsiding now.  See  Piven  and Cloward,  The New  Class  War: Reagan's  Attack on the 
Welfare State and Its Consequences  (Pantheon Books,  1982). 336  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
Without  taking sides on the validity of these models, in this paper  I 
take a general utility-maximization  approach  that could be consistent 
with some composite of all theories. The model  is similar  in spirit  to that 
developed by Orr, but different because it highlights  the parameters 
most relevant  to understanding  the effects of distributing  more respon- 
sibility  to the states-the  parameters  describing  how state  AFDC  benefits 
respond to national food stamp levels (and, in principle, to medicaid 
support)  and to benefits in other states as a result of migration  percep- 
tions. 
Assume that state legislators  are motivated  by the utility  function, 
(4)  Ui =  Ui(Xi, B +  aF), 
where Ui refers to the quasi-concave  utility  function  of the decisive ith 
voter in a state, the voter who, through a set of complex political 
mechanisms,  will determine  state policy; Xi is the disposable  income of 
the voter;  B is the average  income-support  benefit  level in the state;  and 
F is the benefit  level in the food stamp  program.  '5 
I assume that  food stamp  benefits  are determined  exogenously  by the 
federal government and that a utility weight, a,  is applied to those 
benefits;  I assume that the state legislators  maximize  utility  by manipu- 
lating  B, balancing  gains and  costs at the margin.  A wide range  of values 
for a is possible. If food stamps are perceived by the decisive voter as 
fully substitutable for money, a  should be  1.0. If food stamps are 
considered in-kind  benefits and are viewed as less desirable  than cash 
support,  a should be less than 1.0. If the decisive voter prefers  to give 
in-kind  assistance rather  than cash assistance, a could even be greater 
than 1.0. And, if the decisive voter takes no account of the other 
programs  in deciding  on support  levels for AFDC, a should  be zero. 
The two identities  that give the budget  constraint  in this system are, 
for the household, 
(5)  Xi=  Y(I  -t) 
15. Medicaid  benefits can, in principle,  be treated symmetrically  with food stamp 
payments  in this model, and the reader  can consider  both in this conceptual  discussion. 
But  as I explain  below in discussing  the empirical  implementation  of the model,  it proved 
impossible  to obtain  the data  needed  to introduce  medicaid  payments,  so I omit  them  from 
the analysis. Edward  M. Gramlich  337 
where Yi  is personal  income before  taxes and t is a proportional  tax rate 
used to pay for AFDC benefits;'6  for states, 
(6)  tY =  (1 -  m  +  mz)(RB/N), 
where 
Y = average  per capita  income in the state 
N  =  state population 
in = federal matching  rate as before, with the grant as- 
sumed  to be open-ended 
R =  number of AFDC recipients 
z = ratio  of state to federal  income and 
1 -  m +  mz =  total cost to state taxpayers of raising AFDC benefits. 
Taxpayers  pay (1 -  m) directly, and then must pay 100  z percent  of all 
federal matching  expenses. Since the tax rate t finances  both the state 
share and part of the federal share, it includes both state and federal 
taxes. Note also that only B appears  in the budget  identity:  F is paid  for 
by the federal government  and need not be financed  by taxpayers  in a 
state. 
To this point  the maximization  exercise is a standard  one of maximiz- 
ing utility subject to these two budget constraints. The complicating 
feature in the AFDC system is that the recipient  population  cannot be 
viewed as exogenous, but  instead  depends  on benefit  levels in surround- 
ing states. Defining  these benefit  levels as B, an equation  that  expresses 
how legislators  perceive  the relation  between the number  of recipients 
and  relative  benefit  levels is 
(7)  R  =  R(B/B)b, 
where  R is the number  of recipients  in a state in which  benefits  received 
in that state are equal to benefits  available  outside the state, and  b is the 
perceived  migration  elasticity.  17 
16. At this  point  one might  ask  whether  the  federal  tax deduction  for state  taxes should 
be included  in equation  5. Since (1 -  t) solves out of the theoretical  model  in the way I use 
it, this question  is not of great practical  importance.  But even apart  from this, because 
most voters do not itemize deductions,  the decisive voter may not. I took the liberty  of 
ignoring  the federal  deduction. 
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The model is solved by assuming  some functional  form  for the utility 
function and substituting  in the constraint equations 5, 6, and 7 to 
determine  the tax price of benefits. Because the system contains both 
nonlinear  and linear  equations, some approximations  are necessary to 
arrive  at an estimating  equation. 
A first  way to solve the model is to approximate  the benefit  equation 
implied  by the utility  function  by 
(8)  B  =  coeciz  YC2P-73F-c6, 
where the elasticity c6  is assumed  to be 
(9)  -  =a  ln Bla ln F  =  (a B/a F)(F/B)  =  -  a(F/B), 
where F refers to average  food stamp  levels in a state and  B to average 
AFDC benefits, with each average taken over time for the state. 
Expressing  this elasticity  in this form  makes  it an explicit  function  of the 
coefficient  a, which can then be estimated  directly  by substituting  into 8 
to obtain 
(10)  lnB  = ln cOclZ  +  c2n  -C3lnPB-a(F/)ln  F. 
Using 5, 6, and 7 yields 
(1 1)  Xi =  Yi -  (Yi/f)(1  -  m +  mz)(JIN)Bb+ 
I (B)  -b, 
so that 
verify  equations  like 7 with direct  evidence, in fact there  is at least  one study  that  appears 
to do that. Using a large-scale survey of AFDC recipients taken in 1967, Lawrence 
Southwick,  Jr., has estimated  large  and statistically  significant  b values in specifications 
similar  to 7. Southwick's  data  apparently  only contain  information  on the birthplace  and 
the place of receipt of benefits  for AFDC recipients,  by the nine census regions  in the 
United  States, and  the results  of his study  should  be accepted  with  a good deal  of caution. 
But the apparent  impact  of AFDC benefits  on migration  is quite strong.  See his "Public 
Welfare  Programs  and  Recipient  Migration,"  Growth  and Change,  vol. 12  (October  1981), 
pp. 22-32. 
Moreover,  even if recipients  themselves  were  not strongly  influenced  by relative  AFDC 
benefit  levels, if for any reason  legislators  took their  cue from  other  states  in the setting  of 
benefits, the model developed below would work as formulated.  The political  science 
literature  contains  one such rationale-political diffusion  of innovations  in state policy. 
Under  this theory, policy changes spread  like "ink blots" across the national  map. See, 
for  example,  Jack  L. Walker,  "The  Diffusion  of Innovations  among  the  American  States," 
American  Political  Science  Review,  vol.  63  (September  1969),  pp.  880-99;  and  Ira 
Sharkansky,  "Regionalism,  Economic  Status,  and  the  Public  Policies  of American  States," 
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(12)  PB --(  Xila B)  =  (b  +  1)(YilY)(1  -  m  +  mz)(RIN)Bb(B)-b, 
and, inserting  into 10  to give an estimating  equation  yields18 
(13)  In B =  [1/(1 +  c3b)]{ln  c' +  cIZ  +  c2 ln Y 
-  c3[ln(1 -  m +  mz) +  ln(R/N)] 
+  c3b ln B  -  a (F/B)  In F}, 
where c' is a new intercept  term  that includes  all of the constants  in 12. 
The econometric  problem  in estimating  13  when B and  B are correlated 
in cross-sections is dealt with by including  state dummy variables  as 
explained below. The inclusion of state dummies  along with B leaves 
relatively little opportunity  for variations  in F, either across states or 
through  time, to explain  B. Thus  one would  not expect to estimate  a with 
much  precision  using  equation 13. 
An alternative way to estimate the model is  to take a different 
logarithmic  approximation  of the basic benefits  equation: 
(14)  B + aF  =  coecZfYC2P  B3. 
In this version the migration  relation  in 7 was replaced  by 
(15)  R  =  R(B  +  aF)b (B  +  aF)  b 
where B  and F  refer to  benefit levels  in surrounding  states. This 
formulation  required  an additional  simplifying  assumption  to get to the 
estimating  equation:  19 
(16)  ln (B +  aF)  =  [1/(1 +  c3b)]{ln  c'  +  cIZ  +  c2In  Y 
-  c3 [ln(1 -  m +  mz) +  ln(R/N)] 
+  c3b ln(Bi  + aF)}. 
19. The approximation  involves assuming  the expression  [1 + bBI(B  + aF)], which 
comes from  differentiating  11  with 15  substituted  in, is constant.  It can be seen that  when 
a = 0, the expression  truly  is constant.  When  a >  0, the term  in brackets  involves  the ratio 
of AFDC  benefits  (B)  to what  might  be called  full  benefits  (B + aF) in the particular  state. 
There  is no obvious way to solve this expression  so that it is included  in the dependent 
variable;  nor is there an easy way to deal with it in estimation  without introducing 
simultaneous  equations  bias once again. So I just made the simplifying  assumption  and 
compared  results of estimating  the model this way with the results  of estimating  it from 
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This expression can only be estimated  by assuming  different  values for 
a and searching  for the value that maximizes  the fit. Because the effect 
on the estimates of the simplifying  assumption  needed to derive 16 is 
unclear, I discuss the model mainly  using 13. However, I also refer to 
the results of estimating 16 in considering  the uncertainty  with which 
some important  parameters  are estimated. 
EMPIRICAL  IMPLEMENTATION 
Estimating  the benefits equations  presented  complex data problems 
and required several compromises and approximations  to be made. 
These need to be addressed  before turning  to the empirical  results and 
their interpretation.  The model was fitted to pooled time-series, cross- 
sectional data on state AFDC payments for 1974-81. Although as a 
general rule added data points are valuable, there are several reasons 
for not beginning  the sample  before 1974.  One  is that  casual  evidence on 
the growth of AFDC benefit levels suggests that views about welfare 
may have changed since the late 1960s  and early 1970s:  in most states, 
average  real  benefit  levels were generally  rising  until  the early 1970s  and 
have been generally declining since. Moreover, food stamps were not 
available  in all counties until 1974,  and  it is quite  difficult  to measure  the 
value of F for individual  states before 1974.  Finally,  as explained  below, 
it is more  difficult  to deal with matching  rates  before 1974. 
Measuring  AFDC  Benefits.  Each  of  the  AFDC  variables  requires 
some explanation. The dependent variable in  13, B,  measures the 
generosity  of a state's AFDC plan. It can be expressed as 
(17)  B = G-sjE-s2U, 
where G is the guarantee  level, or payment  to a family  with zero outside 
income; E is earned income; U is unearned  income; and si and 52  are 
benefit  reduction,  or implicit  tax, rates. All variables  vary  widely across 
states, and this makes it difficult to characterize state plans in one 
dimension. 
The least satisfactory  approach,  though  that followed in most other 
empirical  studies of AFDC, is simply  to use average  statewide  benefits 
per recipient as a measure of B. One disadvantage  of this approach  is 
that guarantee  levels depend on family size, so observed benefit  levels 
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disadvantage  is that earned  income clearly depends on both guarantee 
levels and tax rates. As G increases in a state, E will decrease, and 
observed benefit levels will decrease by varying  amounts  because the 
implicit  tax rate, sl, varies. This tax rate was supposedly fixed at 67 
percent  by the 1967  amendments  to the Social Security  Act, but  because 
states allow differing  amounts  of work-related  deductions,  effective tax 
rates  on earnings  have been estimated  to range  from  2 percent  in Missouri 
to 43 percent  in Connecticut.20  Hence observed  benefit  levels should  be 
correlated  rather  poorly with some true  index of state AFDC policy. 
Measuring  G by the statewide  guarantee  level for a family  of standard 
size avoids  both  of these difficulties.  Such  a measure  obviously  is affected 
neither  by variation  in actual  family size nor by endogenous  responses 
of E to this guarantee.  But while G is fully exogenous, it may  not be fully 
informative.  On the one hand, states exercise a good deal of administra- 
tive discretion  over both payment  levels and eligibility,  discretion  that 
may  not be captured  in  or  correlated  with  G. On  the  other  hand,  statewide 
variation  in the implicit  tax rates on benefits, s1 and  S2,  is also relevant, 
and  is not reflected  in the G variable. 
A sensible solution to this problem,  one familiar  to budget analysts 
who compute  a  full-employment  surplus,  is to subtract  from  standardized 
guarantee  levels standardized  values of s IE and s2U  or 
(18)  B = G-siE-s2U, 
where the s1 and s2 are estimated  for a state and the E and U values are 
standardized  for all states. This  is what  I have done  in the empirical  work 
described below. G levels are taken as guarantee  levels for an AFDC 
family of four (mother  and three children),  expressed in 1981  dollars. 
The E and U are taken from 1976  values in Michigan's  Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics, as reported by Moffitt, again converted to  1981 
dollars for an AFDC family of four.21  The tax rates were taken from 
Moffitt's  estimates of effective tax rates  for various  states from  a large- 
20. The two articles  that first  laid out these problems  are Irene  Lurie, "Estimates  of 
Tax Rates in the AFDC Program,"  National Tax  Journal,  vol. 27 (March  1974),  pp. 93- 
111;  and Robert  M. Hutchens, "Changes  in AFDC Tax Rates, 1967-1971,"  Journal  of 
Human  Resources, vol. 13  (Winter  1978),  pp. 60-74. My numbers  are  taken  from  a recent 
estimation  of the parameters  of state  plans  by Robert  A. Moffitt,  "An Economic  Model  of 
Welfare  Stigma"  (University  of Wisconsin,  October  1981). 
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scale 1975  AFDC survey. This survey was only done for one year, so 
my B series contains no time-series  variation  in tax rates for particular 
states (though  it does for the guarantee  level). Also, because of small 
cell sizes, Moffitt  reports  tax rates  for only thirty-five  states. 
Food Stamps. To be consistent  with  the treatment  of AFDC  benefits, 
the food stamp  benefits term, F, was measured  for an AFDC family of 
four  in 1981  dollars  with average  values according  to the Michigan  study 
for E and U. Although  I have treated F as exogenous in deriving  the 
theoretical  model, in fact it is not fully exogenous from an econometric 
standpoint  because the food stamp  program  contains  an implicit  tax on 
AFDC benefits:  as a state raises B one dollar,  its F value declines by a 
statutory  amount  of $0.30 and an actual  amount  of somewhat  less. This 
raises the possibility of simultaneous  equations bias in estimating  the 
model. I dealt with this problem by using a two-stage least squares 
procedure  in which actual  F values were everywhere  replaced  by their 
first-stage predictions (based on a regression of F  on the system's 
exogenous variables)  in estimating  the benefits  equations. 
The Federal Matching Rate.  The next variable requiring explanation 
is the AFDC matching  rate, m. As stated above, from its early days 
AFDC has operated with a matching  grant formula  under which the 
federal government pays a progressively declining share of AFDC 
benefits  as B levels rise. Estimating  the relevant  response  parameters  in 
such a circumstance raises substantial  econometric difficulties. It is 
possible to deal with such problems,22  but the attempt  would be mainly 
of historical or methodological  interest. By 1974, forty-one (twenty- 
seven in my sample) states had switched over to the flat, open-ended 
medicaid formula for AFDC reimbursement,  and by 1979 all states 
except Arizona and Texas (making thirty-three  in my sample) had 
switched. To spare  the econometric  problems,  Ijust fit  the model  for the 
thirty-three  states that were on the medicaid  formula.23 
B in Surrounding  States.  In terms of the theory as expressed in 
equation  7, B for a particular  state should  refer  to AFDC  guarantee  levels 
22. See, for example, Robert  A. Moffitt,  "The Effects of Grants-in-Aid  on State and 
Local Expenditures:  The Case of AFDC," to be presented  at a National Bureau  of 
Economic  Research  conference,  November  1982,  for one such  attempt. 
23. This meant that the sample size was twenty-seven  states in my sample  on the 
medicaid  formula  for the duration  multiplied  by seven annual  observations  (1975-81)  plus 
six midterm  switchers  multiplied  by three  annual  observations  (1979-81),  for  a total  of 207 
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either in those states from which recipients would be most likely to 
emigrate  or in states that, for one reason or another, are considered 
worth emulating  (see note 17). Very little is known about how AFDC 
beneficiaries  or positive taxpayers are perceived to respond to fiscal 
inducements,  or about emulation  in general. One way to deal with this 
is to define  B as average  benefit  levels in states  bordering  on the  particular 
state. This approach  gives the strict  construction  of what is meant  by a 
surrounding  state, and  reflects  the fact that  moving  costs should  depend 
on the distance moved. Another  is to assume that  moving  involves high 
fixed  costs and  low marginal  costs, and  then simply  take AFDC benefits 
averaged  in all other states as the measure.  This latter  approach  works 
better in the empirical work and is the definition  used in the results 
presented  below. Since the response  to benefit  differences  is likely  to be 
lagged,  B is defined  to be a weighted average  of the current  and recent 
past values with declining  weights. 
Medicaid  Payments. As I observed in note 15, in principle  medicaid 
payments  should  be treated  in parallel  with food stamp  benefits.  From  a 
policy standpoint,  there would also be interest  in including  medicaid  in 
this model because medicaid  payments  are also slated to change in the 
new federalism  proposals. However, there are severe data problems  in 
trying  to model medicaid. 
Nationally medicaid appears to  dominate both AFDC and food 
stamps;  in fiscal 1981  federal  and state medicaid  expenditures  were $29 
billion, food stamp  expenditures  were $11.3 billion, and AFDC expen- 
ditures  were $14.7 billion. But medicaid  plays a much smaller  role in an 
AFDC model than one might expect on the basis of these numbers 
because, of the $29 billion in medicaid  expenditures, only about one- 
fourth  is devoted to the AFDC population.  The remainder  finances  gaps 
left by medicare-nursing home  expenses and  coinsurance,  deductibles, 
and  premiums  under  medicare.24  When  medicare-type  expenditures  are 
deducted, medicaid becomes a much less significant  factor. Another 
reason  for de-emphasizing  medicaid  is that statewide  data  on medicaid 
expenditures  per AFDC family are available  only sporadically,  for four 
of the seven years in the sample. Those data that are available show 
quite  wide, and not very logical, fluctuations,  from  month  to month  and 
from year to year. If medicaid  were to be included  at all, it would only 
24. See Louise B. Russell's section entitled "Health," in Joseph  A. Pechman,  ed., 
Setting National  Priorities: The 1982 Budget (Brookings  Institution,  1981),  pp. 67-72. 344  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1982 
be as a variable  that is constant  for a particular  state; it would become 
perfectly  collinear  with a state dummy;  and because state dummies  are 
necessary  to estimate  the model  with  B on the right-hand  side, medicaid 
had  to be dropped  as an independent  variable. 
Price  Correction. The effect of  prices was modeled after some 
experimentation.  All money-flow  variables  in the model are converted 
to 1981  dollars  using the appropriate  general  price deflator  (the overall 
consumer price index for B,  the food index for F,  and so on). This 
deflation puts everything in real terms but raises the possibility that 
nonindexed  AFDC  benefits  will  be temporarily  lowered  by unanticipated 
rises in prices. To test for this influence, I tried including  the two-year 
change in prices, with an expected negative sign, to allow for price 
recognition  and adjustment  lags. I also tried  to eliminate  cross-sectional 
variation  in prices by using the twenty-five-city  CPI index, again with 
an expected negative sign, to reflect  regional  price  differences.25 
The other variables in the basic models (equation 13 or 16) are the 
base recipient-population  ratio (RIN) and the preference  vector, Z. To 
eliminate  simultaneous  variation  in the former,  it would  be necessary  to 
use some state average, again  making  this variable  collinear  with state 
dummies  and  forcing  it to be dropped.  For  Z, as mentioned  above, it was 
necessary to use separate dummies for each state to correct for the 
simultaneous  equations  bias that would otherwise  result  from  having  B 
and  B on opposite sides of the estimating  equation  13.  I also included  the 
ratio  of recipients  that were nonwhite  and the state unemployment  rate 
as additional  shift variables. 
To recapitulate,  then, the basic models to be estimated  are 13  and 16. 
In each case an extensive set of preference  variables  (state dummies, 
and  so forth)  is used for the Z vector;  the  F variable  is the result  of a two- 
stage least squares  estimation;  the R variable  is a cross-sectional  con- 
stant; and the B terms are constructed  in the complex way described 
above. Other  than these exceptions, the models estimated  are exactly 
as written. 
25. That the cross-sectional  sign should  be negative  can be seen as follows. Suppose 
13  is expressed  in terms  of B' and Y',  where  B' = B (P/P),  P is the national  price  level, and 
P is some true  regional  price. Substituting  B' and Y'  into 13  yields  the equation  given  there 
with one more  term, -  [(1 +  c3b -  c2)I(1  +  c3b)]  In (P/P). Unless the income  elasticity, 
c2, is greater  than 1.0 (which it does not seem to be in the estimates  given below), this 
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ESTIMATES  OF  THE  MODEL 
Three estimates of the AFDC model are shown in table 1. The first 
row, equation 1-1, corresponds to equation 13; the second and third 
rows, 1-2 and 1-3, to 16. Although 1-1  and 1-2  produce  nearly  identical 
estimates of the important  coefficients and hence of the underlying 
parameters  of the model that  are of special  interest  for evaluating  policy 
changes, I regard  the results in 1-1  as the most reliable  results  available 
from  these data  because the derivation  of equation 16  that underlies  1-2 
and 1-3 is exact for the case when a equals 0 as in 1-2, but involves a 
simplification  otherwise. Nonetheless, the sharply  different  coefficients 
in 1-3 suggest the estimates are uncertain and must be viewed with 
caution. 
Substitution  between B and F.  The evidence  from 1-I that a equals 
zero indicates that voters do not alter AFDC benefits in response to 
changes in federally funded programs  such as food stamps. Thus it is 
possible for voters nationally  to set a floor on total benefits,  B + F, by 
setting a floor on F, and to change this floor by changing  F. (The latter 
would not be true if a were 1.0.) The present  AFDC-food  stamp  system 
thus appears to allow for dual determination  of floors for state and 
national  benefits. 
This a parameter  is important  in assessing the impact of President 
Reagan's new federalism  plan. Initially  the president  proposed  turning 
food stamps  back to the states along with AFDC. The revised proposal 
indicates  that the administration  has agreed  to maintain  food stamps  as 
a national  program,  presumably  because of strong objections by state 
governors. If a equals zero, as the estimates here suggest, direct cash 
and in-kind  benefits to the poor would have dropped  sharply  with the 
original  federalism  plan (by over 30 percent  for the average state), and 
they will now not change  in the revised  plan. The  poor  have a great  stake 
in the debate now taking place about which level of government is 
responsible  for food stamps.26 
Income  and  Price  Elasticities.  The  next  key  parameters  are  the 
income and  price elasticities, c2  and  C3. For 1-1  and 1-2  in table 1 below, 
c2 is roughly equal to C3; for 1-3, c2 is twice as large as C3.  Equation  3 
26. This  comment  ignores  the income  effect;  if F declines,  the revenue  will  be returned 
to states and result  in a very small  (1 percent)  change  in their  real  income.  That  will raise 
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showed that federal open-ended matching  grants can make expected 
state supplementation  levels independent of state income when the 
income exponent, c5, equals C2/C3.  If that ratio is 1.0, the formula  for 
making  state supplementation  independent  of income would  become 
(19)  (1 -  m) =  0.00004 Y, 
where Y  is state per capita  income and the constant, 0.00004,  is chosen 
so that  the mean  statewide  federal  matching  rate  equals  the actual  mean. 
The actual  formula  for state supplementation  is 
(20)  (I -  m) =  0.45 (Y/Y)2for0.45  (ilY)2  <0.5 
(1 -  m) =  0.5 for 0.45 (Y/Y)2  >0.5, 
where Y  is national  average per capita income. If the proper  value for 
C2/C3  is near 2.0, as is suggested  by 1-3, the ideal matching  rate  formula 
in Feldstein's sense requires (1 -  m)  =  c4Y  2,  which would be very 
similar  to the actual formula. If C2/C3 is near 1.0, as suggested by the 
other two equations, the ideal matching  rates differs  from their actual 
values. 
Table  2 compares  actual  with  power-equalizing  matching  rates  for the 
thirty-three  states in the sample  under  the assumption  that  C2/C3 equals 
1.0. The correspondence between actual matching shares and those 
necessary to make expected state-supplementation  levels independent 
of state income is still reasonably  good. Because the exponent is larger 
in the formula  for actual  shares, the variance  of matching  rates  is higher 
than that in the computed  power-equalization  shares-Mississippi, for 
example,  has  an  actual  share  of 0.233  and  a computed  power-equalization 
share  of 0.296. 
Even though  the open-ended  grant  formula  equalizes  fiscal power, it 
comes far  from  equalizing  AFDC benefits  across  the country.  One  might 
then ask why Mississippi, a state with very low benefits, should  have a 
rise in its price? Given the relatively  low income-elasticity,  Mississippi 
is  here depicted as  paying low  AFDC benefits mainly because of 
preferences,  and the impact  of these preferences  is not equalized  by the 
computed federal formula. The present formula succeeds reasonably 
well in making  expected state-supplementation  levels independent  of 
income, but that turns out to be a limited achievement. The way to 
reduce statewide variation in benefits, as stated above, would be to 
return  to the kind of kinked AFDC matching  formula that prevailed 
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Table 2.  Actual  State  AFDC  Matching  Share  Compared  to Value  that Neutralizes 
Expected  State  Supplementation  Levels 
Power- 
Actual  equalization 
state matching  value 
share, 1981  if C2  =  C3 
State  (1 -  m + mz)  (0 00004Y)  Difference 
Alabama  0.299  0.335  -  0.036 
Arkansas  0.279  0.328  -  0.049 
California  0.553  0.492  0.061 
Colorado  0.475  0.455  0.020 
Connecticut  0.507  0.530  -  0.023 
District of Columbia  0.501  0.550  -0.049 
Florida  0.437  0.410  0.027 
Georgia  0.349  0.366  -  0.017 
Illinois  0.525  0.469  0.056 
Indiana  0.441  0.394  0.047 
Kansas  0.470  0.444  0.026 
Kentucky  0.330  0.345  -0.015 
Louisiana  0.325  0.387  -  0.062 
Maine  0.308  0.353  -  0.045 
Maryland  0.509  0.471  0.038 
Massachusetts  0.496  0.455  0.041 
Michigan  0.520  0.449  0.071 
Minnesota  0.454  0.439  0.015 
Mississippi  0.233  0.296  -  0.063 
Missouri  0.409  0.403  0.006 
New  Jersey  0.516  0.494  0.022 
New  York  0.538  0.467  0.071 
North  Carolina  0.341  0.354  -  0.013 
Ohio  0.475  0.423  0.052 
Oregon  0.450  0.408  0.042 
Pennsylvania  0.477  0.423  0.054 
South Carolina  0.300  0.329  -  0.029 
Tennessee  0.320  0.351  -  0.031 
Utah  0.324  0.339  -  0.015 
Virginia  0.448  0.426  0.022 
Washington  0.509  0.460  0.049 
West Virginia  0.332  0.340  -  0.018 
Wisconsin  0.432  0.410  0.022 
Addenda 
Unweighted  average  0.421  0.412  -  0.009 
Standard deviation  0.090  0.063  0.039 
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Migration Effects  The third  key behavioral  variable  is the migration 
perception parameter, b.  Recalling the previous discussion, if b  is 
nonzero, either the perception of migration  or emulation in general 
prevents states from raising their own AFDC benefits too far above 
those of their  neighbors.  The empirical  results  of table 1  indicate  that  the 
migration  terms  are  always  highly  significant.  When  states  are  confronted 
with some exogenous change  (such  as a change  in the matching  rate)  and 
the migration  term is included  in the calculation  (as in a Cournot-Nash 
process), the long-run  equilibrium  change in benefits becomes much 
larger.  Roughly  the same is true  in all other  equations  in table 1. 
An objection  could be that  common  trends  in  B and  B lead to this high 
coefficient  on B and  mistakenly  give it causal  significance.  Since  B gives 
a substantial  weight to the average of B in the current  year, there is a 
simultaneity  problem  and  the coefficient  of B may  be biased  toward  1.0. 
Because of this possible bias, it is useful to compare  the implied  values 
of b, shown in the sixth column  of the table, with direct  estimates  of b. 
Southwick's  estimates referred  to in note 17  clustered  at about 1.0.27 If 
one had constrained  the coefficient to the value implied  by this inde- 
pendent  estimate  of migration  effects, essentially  the same  results  would 
have been obtained  for the other  parameters  in 1-1  or 1-2. 
To see how the Cournot-Nash  process  would  work  for  the coefficients 
in 1-1, I simulated  the impact  of the new federalism  proposals  on state 
AFDC benefits. Turning  AFDC over to states means  essentially setting 
the  federal  matching  share  equal  to zero. I assume  this change  was made 
in 1976,  and compute steady-state  percentage  reductions  in benefits  by 
1981. The first two columns of table 3 show actual 1981  AFDC-food 
stamp  benefits (B and B  +  F) for families with standardized  levels of 
outside income, in 1981 dollars. Combined benefits average $396 a 
month, with a standard  deviation of $80. The predicted  long-run  per- 
centage changes from equation 1-1 if other states are assumed not to 
change  their benefits are given in the third  column. The reduction  of m 
to zero raises the price of AFDC to states by an average of about 75 
percent,  and  lowers benefits  by an average  of 56  percent,  with  a standard 
27. Southwick,  "Public  Welfare  Programs."  I got this from  his test 5, where  he finds 
that  a 10  percent  increase  in B increases  in-migration  of welfare  recipients  by 25 percent. 
Since  migrant  welfare  recipients  in a census region  are  about  half  the total,  total  R rises by 
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Table 3.  AFDC  Benefits  and  Percentage  Reductions  Eliminating  Federal  Matchinga 
1981 actual  Equation 1-1 
Monthly  Monthly  Steady-state 
state  state  percentage  Steady-state 
AFDC  combined  reduction  percentage 
benefit  benefit  in B,  no  reduction 
level,  B  level, B  +  F  migration  in B, 
State  (dollars)  (dollars)  perception  full  model 
Alabama  91  265  68.5  98.2 
Arkansas  166  319  70.6  98.3 
California  534  576  43.3  96.8 
Colorado  289  404  50.9  97.2 
Connecticut  482  540  47.8  97.0 
District of Columbia  284  401  48.4  97.1 
Florida  158  312  54.8  97.4 
Georgia  175  324  63.5  97.9 
Illinois  284  401  46.0  96.9 
Indiana  263  385  54.3  97.4 
Kansas  306  416  51.4  97.2 
Kentucky  171  321  65.4  98.0 
Louisiana  147  305  65.9  98.1 
Maine  354  450  67.6  98.2 
Maryland  264  386  47.6  97.0 
Massachusetts  373  463  48.9  97.1 
Michigan  383  470  46.5  97.0 
Minnesota  417  493  53.1  97.3 
Mississippi  107  277  75.2  98.6 
Missouri  284  401  57.5  97.6 
New  Jersey  335  436  46.9  97.0 
New  York  431  503  44.7  96.9 
North Carolina  132  294  64.3  98.0 
Ohio  234  366  51.0  97.2 
Oregon  298  410  53.5  97.4 
Pennsylvania  321  426  50.7  97.2 
South Carolina  113  281  68.4  98.2 
Tennessee  119  286  66.4  98.1 
Utah  326  429  66.0  98.1 
Virginia  267  389  53.6  97.4 
Washington  414  492  47.6  97.0 
West Virginia  158  312  65.2  98.0 
Wisconsin  458  522  55.2  97.5 
Addenda 
Mean  277  396  56.4  97.5 
Standard deviation  119  80  9.1  0.5 
Source:  Same as table  1 and author's  calculations. 
a.  The  federal  matching  share is  assumed  to become  zero  in  1976, and the corresponding  reductions  in benefits 
are computed  for  1981. The benefits  shown  are for families  with standardized levels  of outside  income  as described 
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deviation  of 9 percent.  This is a large  reduction  in and  of itself. But  when 
other states are allowed to respond, as in a full dynamic  simulation  of 
that equation with all states endogenous, benefits are reduced by an 
average of nearly 98 percent, with a standard  deviation of less than 1 
percent.  The reason  the mean  percentage  reduction  rises so much  is the 
multiplier  due to the series of Cournot-Nash  interactions.  The reason 
the standard  deviation  actually  declines is that the initial  responses are 
more disparate  because the price changes  are uneven across states, but 
when the Cournot-Nash  reactions are added, all states are subject to 
similar  demonstration  effects. 
THE  INCOME-SUPPORT  SYSTEM 
Each of these key parameter  estimates illustrates  an important  char- 
acteristic  of the current  hybrid  AFDC-food  stamp  system. The first  two 
estimates show the system in a reasonably favorable light. Since a 
appears to be close  to zero, it is not only possible for the federal 
government  to impose a floor  of F under  combined  benefits,  B + F, but 
to make marginal  changes in this floor without offsetting  changes in B 
(which  would obviously not be true if a were 1.0). The same coefficient 
indicates  that  combined  benefits  depend  greatly  on whether  food stamps 
will remain as a federal program  or shifted to state responsibility.  As 
indicated  in discussing the empirical  results above, the estimate that a 
equals  zero on which  these inferences  are  based  is not offered  with  great 
confidence. Any inferences about major changes in federal support 
would  be made  with more  confidence  if they could  be based  on data  from 
periods  when food stamps  were varying  more  in real  terms. 
The estimated  income and  price  elasticities  suggest  that  power  equal- 
ization-matching  shares are not far from the state matching  shares  now 
contained  in present  law, implying  that state supplementation  levels are 
approximately  independent  of state income. But statewide  benefits  still 
vary widely. This shows that neutralizing  income-induced  disparities  in 
benefits accomplishes little in the way of equalizing  AFDC benefits 
across states. Apparently the only way benefits can be significantly 
equalized  within  the present  grant  structure  is by reintroducing  the kinks 
in the AFDC formula  that were allowed to evaporate  with inflation  and 
the introduction  of the medicaid  formula  for AFDC reimbursement. 
One parameter  estimate points out an unfavorable  aspect of the 352  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
current  system. The migration  or emulation  parameter  is so large that 
state supplementation  levels are clearly dependent on those in other 
states. As long as states set benefits  in an uncoordinated  manner,  these 
supplementation  levels do not reflect the unconstrained  preferences  of 
legislators in different states, and thus do not indicate state voter 
preferences. Moreover, they can lead to a highly unstable response 
pattern  when pervasive exogenous changes are made in federal  policy, 
such as the proposed  reduction  in federal  matching  rates. 
The obvious programmatic  remedy  for the latter  two problems  would 
be to move toward  a more  nationalized  determination  of AFDC  benefits, 
with a higher federal floor on benefit levels or with nonlinearities  in 
federal  matching  shares  that  would  reduce  the variance  in  benefits  among 
states. The original  administration  proposal,  in attempting  to decentral- 
ize determination  of both AFDC benefits and food stamps, appears  to 
move in exactly the wrong  direction.  But if the administration  agrees  to 
a  ' "compromise''  in which food stamp guarantees  are continued as a 
national program, and in which a minimum  is built into the AFDC 
program (as eight former Secretaries of the Department  of Health, 
Education, and Welfare  proposed in September 1982),  there would be 
movement  in exactly the right  direction. 
Should Categorical Grants Be Continued? 
The other significant  change  proposed  by the president  is to eliminate 
most of the restrictions  on federal categorical  grants. This happens  in 
various ways. Last year Congress, acting on the president's  initiative, 
converted fifty-seven categorical  grant programs  to block-grant  form, 
with  much  less restrictive  spending  conditions  on state  and  local  govern- 
ments. This year another forty-one categorical programs  are to be 
consolidated,  implying  a total switch of $14 billion  to block-grant  form. 
In 1984  the president  proposes  to take all the block grants  created  under 
President Nixon,  those created in his own administration,  general 
revenue  sharing,  and still  more  categorical  funds  and  throw  them  all into 
a giant  trust  fund  that  in effect forms  a block  grant  for the whole package. 
At the end of the decade financial  responsibility  for operating  the trust 
fund reverts to state governments,  and in any realistic sense the cate- 
gorical  grant  programs  have been killed.  The long-run  budget  plan  of the Edward M.  Gramlich  353 
administration  lists only $25 billion in categorical  grants  by the end of 
the decade, less than one-third  of the level at the start of the Reagan 
presidency. 
The  details  of this  plan  are  still  being  negotiated  with  state  governments 
and  it is too early to know  just what  the outcome  will be. Even if it were 
not too early, it would be very difficult  to put  a tracer  on all the programs 
and all the money, and that is not what I propose  to do here. What  I do 
instead is use a model of the state and local budget  process to appraise 
the general suggestions raised by the president-loosening  strings on 
federal  grants  and cutting  back on the federal  money. The way in which 
this is done is to examine, using time-series data on state and local 
government  aggregates,  how the state  and  local sector  responded  to past 
changes in grants and other variables and, within this model, how it 
seemed to respond to earlier  block grant  initiatives  made by President 
Nixon. 
The model used to examine these effects is essentially the one 
employed  in my 1978  article  attempting  to explain  the mysterious  rise in 
the state and local general government  budget surplus.28  That model 
derives a set of demand  equations for different  types of expenditures, 
taxes, and the budget surplus  from orthodox  utility-maximization  prin- 
ciples and  estimates  the model subject  to the budget  identity  constraints. 
The model allows for grants with different  categorical  restrictions  to 
have different  effects on state and local fiscal responses, and also for 
stock-flow adjustment  behavior  in which short-term  changes in grants 
can influence  the surplus  (as they appear  to). But  once stocks of financial 
and  physical  assets have been accumulated  to their  target  level, changes 
in the surplus and net physical investment cease, and all changes are 
equally  reflected  in noninvestment  expenditures  and  revenues. 
The new mociel  adheres  to this spirit  closely with only a few changes. 
Because I am now interested  in the impact  of categorical  or block  grants 
on the normal  public  goods expenditures  of state  and  local governments, 
I disaggregate  budget expenditures  into AFDC transfers  (which have 
already  been dealt with in the previous section and  will not be attended 
to further  here), construction  (which, as the 1978  article  pointed  out, is 
almost impossible to explain using standard  economic type variables 
and  is largely  unaffected  by the 1982  proposed  changes  in grant  catego- 
28. Gramlich,  "State and  Local Budgets." 354  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
rizations),  and all other current  expenditures  of state and local general 
governments.  This section focuses on this last category  of expenditures, 
which I will call public  consumption  purchases.  Since I am particularly 
interested  in the proposed conversion of categorical  to block grants, I 
then  disaggregate  federal  grants  aimed  at supporting  public  consumption 
purchases into their categorical and block components, estimating 
separate coefficients for each. The first of the three important  block 
grants, for social services, appeared  in 1972;  the next, created by the 
Comprehensive  Employment  and Training  Act (CETA), in 1975;  and 
the last, Community  Development Block Grants  (CDBG), in 1976.  To 
derive sensible coefficients it was necessary to extend the regression 
period  through  1981,  and  because quarterly  flows of these grants  are not 
available, I was forced to estimate the model with annual data from 
1946-81. Finally, to impose the cross-equation  coefficient  restrictions, 
I estimated  the model with a regression  technique  that incorporates  the 
budget identity restrictions, permits different autocorrelation  correc- 
tions for different equations, and allows for systematic correlations 
between contemporaneous  residuals  in different  equations. 
Comparing  the first  and second parts  of this paper,  both the first  part 
explaining  AFDC benefits and the second part explaining  public con- 
sumption use an underlying  utility-maximization  framework.  In both 
parts  a key question  involves displacement  of a federal  grant.  In the first 
part,  that  question  is whether  AFDC  benefits  will  be reduced  in response 
to food stamp increases, and of course the mirror-image  question of 
whether  benefits  will  rise  if the  Reagan  administration  succeeds  in  cutting 
out food stamps. In the second part the displacement  issue involves 
present categorical  grants that support  public consumption.  Do these 
grants  simply  allow states  and  localities  to reduce  their  own expenditures 
in an area, or do they add to total spending? Then, if the Reagan 
administration  succeeds in converting  these grants  to block grant  form 
in which they are largely  converted  to cash, will spending  go down, and 
by how much? 
Beyond this central unity of question and technique, there are also 
some differences  between the two parts  of the paper.  The first  part  takes 
a very detailed  look at one fiscal component,  AFDC expenditures,  and 
leaves all other types of expenditures  (public and private)  in a broad 
catchall group, Xi. The second part contains a less detailed  look at its 
primary  focus, public  consumption,  and  disaggregates  the X vector into Edward M.  Gramlich  355 
four  other categories. Further,  since the first  part  involves mainly  price 
and  income  elasticities,  the implied  central  spending  equation  is assumed 
to be logarithmic.  But in the second part  the central  question involves 
the block-grant  conversion, and  because these block-grant  terms  should 
work in linear  fashion with linear state budget identity constants built 
into the estimates, the implied  central spending  equation  is assumed  to 
be linear. 
Five equations-for public  assistance, construction,  public  consump- 
tion purchases,  taxes, and  the surplus-were estimated  simultaneously, 
with  a few trials  on the zero restrictions  for  various  independent  variables 
that  had insignificant  or puzzling  coefficients  in different  equations.  The 
equation  for public  consumption  purchases,  the main  object of interest 
here, had sensible coefficients in almost all trials, while some other 
equations,  such as construction,  performed  poorly.29  To spare  the reader 
a mass of numbers, I present only equations for public consumption 
purchases.  Three  variants  are given in table  4. The variant  in the second 
row drops some of  the independent variables with insignificant  or 
apparently  incorrect  signs somewhere  in the coefficient  matrix;  and the 
variant  in the bottom  row drops  almost  all insignificant  or incorrect  signs 
in the coefficient matrix. It can be  seen that the fit of the public 
consumption  equation  is always quite good, and the coefficients  on the 
most important  variables  change  relatively  little as more  and more  zero 
restrictions  are made on the coefficient matrix. The best equation  for 
public  consumption  purchases  (as opposed to the whole budget  system) 
is clearly  the first-it  fits much  better  than  the others, and  its coefficients 
are always more sensible. 
The dependent  variables  in these equation  systems are discretionary 
expenditures, expenditures on the relevant component minus those 
expenditures  mandated  by categorical  or block grants. To ensure that 
the partial  derivatives show how total public consumption  purchases 
respond  to grants  of various  types, it is necessary  to add  back  mandated 
expenditures.  The partial  derivatives  and elasticities once this is done 
are shown in table 5. In the first, and  probably  best, equation,  a dollar's 
29. For what it is worth, the equation  for AFDC transfers  was fairly  consistent  with 
the results in the first part of the paper. As was the case there, both income and price 
coefficients implied  absolute elasticity values somewhat  below unity. Other  important 
questions, such as the impact  of food stamps  and benefits  in other states, were omitted 
from  the model  used in the second part. E  4 
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worth  of categorical  grants  (with a federal  matching  share  averaging  its 
actual value of 0.8)30 is seen to stimulate  $0.38 worth of state and local 
public consumption expenditures. This apparently  low value results 
from the fact that discretionary  expenditures  depicted in table 4 react 
with a significantly  negative effect to categorical  grants  (as indicated  in 
table  4), reflecting  what  has come to be known  as the grant  displacement, 
or fungibility,  effect. This effect is, not surprisingly,  even stronger  with 
the less constrained  block grants:  here a dollar's  worth of block grants 
stimulates  only $0.20 worth of state-local  public  consumption.  A dollar 
increase in private income stimulates $0.06 of state-local public con- 
sumption  (the implied  income elasticity  being  0.63, a consensus number 
for studies of state-local  behavior),  and  a dollar  of unconstrained  grants 
such as revenue sharing stimulates $0.04 worth of state-local public 
consumption.  The relative size of the latter two numbers  is somewhat 
surprising  in light of a recent debate about  the so-called  flypaper  effect: 
even though  unconstrained  grants  and  income should  theoretically  have 
the same effect on state-local  public  consumption,  in many  other  studies 
unconstrained  grants have been found to have a stronger  effect to the 
extent that "money sticks where it hits."'31  In these equations  there is 
no flypaper  effect. 
The responses shown in table 5 indicate that switching $14 billion 
from categorical  grants to block grants, as the Reagan administration 
has proposed to do for the 1983 budget, will lower state-local public 
consumption  purchases by $2.5 billion, a drop of less than 1 percent 
from  levels likely to be in force in that year. Were  the entire  shift  made, 
about  $10 billion  will be transferred  from  block grants  to unconstrained 
grants  and another  $20 billion  from categorical  grants  to unconstrained 
30. These matching  shares can be computed  from numbers  given in OMB, Special 
Analyses,  Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal  Year 1982, p. 255. The overall 
ratio mentioned  there was adjusted  to remove the influence  of block and unconditional 
grants  (for  which  there  is no matching)  and  grants  to individuals  (for  which,  as was shown 
above, the federal  share  is about  0.58). 
31. The flypaper  term was originally  coined by Arthur  Okun when he edited the 
precursor  to this part of the paper ten years ago. Reasons for it were debated  rather 
extensively in Peter Mieszkowski  and William  H. Oakland,  eds., Fiscal Federalism  and 
Grants-in-Aid  (Washington,  D.C.: Urban  Institute,  1979).  For what  it is worth,  the long- 
term  effect of income  on public  consumption  is just about  $0.06, virtually  the same  as the 
impact  effect, while the long-term  effect of unconstrained  grants  is $0.18. But this larger 
long-run  effect should  certainly  not be attributed  to flypaper,  which  is mainly  a short-run 
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Table 5.  Key Response Parameters, State and Local 
Public Consumption  Purchases 
Willingness to pay 
Partial  derivatives  Elasticitiesa  to eliminate restrictionsb 
Categor- 
Categor-  Block  ical to 
ical to  to uncon-  uncon- 
Equation  Y  Gu  Gc  Gb  Y  Pc  block  strained  strained 
4-1  0.06  0.04  0.38  0.20  0.63  -0.50  0.01  0.01  0.02 
4-2  0.10  -0.04  0.48  0.49  0.97  -0.09  0.00  0.13  0.13 
4-3  0.11  0.00  0.49  -  0.66  1.07  0.27  c  c  c 
Source:  Computations  based on table 4. 
a.  At point of means. 
b.  For conversion  of $10 billion of grants at  1978 values  of prices and expenditures. 
c.  Not  computed  because  the estimated  price elasticity  has the wrong sign. 
grants, lowering state-local public consumption  by $8.4 billion, a drop 
of slightly over 2 percent from levels that would otherwise be in effect 
at the time. Although  there may be significant  changes in expenditures 
for particular  programs,  the overall  reductions  are not large,  clearly  not 
the stuff of fiscal revolutions. They are small first because for all the 
rhetorical  trumpeting  of the growth of categorical  grants, these grants 
are still quite small relative to state-local  public  consumption  expendi- 
tures; and second because, as the coefficient estimates suggest, there 
already  appears  to be a great  deal of displacement  for categorical  grants. 
The final  numbers  in table  5 display  the grant  coefficients  in a different 
way. The expenditure  responses indicate that categorical  grants have 
generally stronger  impacts on the state-local  public consumption  than 
do block grants, presumably  because many of the strings  on grants  are 
untied,  and  that block grants  have stronger  impacts  on public  consump- 
tion than do unconstrained  grants, because not all the strings  on block 
grants  are  untied.  When  the Reagan  administration  made  its  first  proposal 
for converting  categorical  grants  to block grants,  it reduced  these grants 
by 25 percent. Somewhere  in OMB  there could have been a calculation 
that states and localities would be willing  to pay, or forgo, 25 percent  of 
the grants  to have some of the strings  untied. The last three columns  in 
table  5 show, for the three  estimated  equations,  how much  of categorical 
grants states should be willing to forgo to have a categorical grant 
converted to block-grant  form, to have a block grant  converted to an 
unconstrained  grant, and to have a categorical  grant converted to an 
unconstrained  grant. These calculations are done by locating states' 
1978 equilibrium  points under the grants being compared with the Edward M.  Gramlich  359 
responses shown in table 5, using the price elasticity to measure the 
change  in the slope of the indifference  curve over the interval,  and  using 
trigonometric  identities  to determine  how  far  along  the income  (or  block- 
grant)  consumption  line states would have moved on the lower indiffer- 
ence curve intersecting  the constrained  grant  equilibrium  point. 
The willingness-to-pay  calculations show that in the first equation, 
which performs  best, states are already  able to divert  categorical  funds 
to their own purposes to a sufficient degree that they would be only 
willing to forgo 1 percent of these grants to have them converted to 
block-grant  form. According  to these calculations,  the OMB  cut in  funds 
of 25 percent  was much  too large  to leave states as well off. Even block 
grants  have some strings,  so states should  be willing  to sacrifice  another 
1 percent of the block grants to have them converted to completely 
unconstrained  grants  such as general  revenue sharing.  According  to the 
second equation,  the response to block grants  and categorical  grants  is 
identical;  states would  not be willing  to sacrifice  at all to have the strings 
removed, and again, OMB  cut grants  too much  in 1981.  But since block 
grants have a larger spending impact than unconstrained  grants, and 
because the price elasticity is lower in this equation, states would be 
willing  to sacrifice  13  percent  of their  categorical  or block  grants  to have 
them converted  to unconstrained  grants. 
Whether  one looks at expenditure  responses or willingness  to pay, 
the inescapable  conclusion  is that  this component  of the new federalism 
is much  ado about nothing.  Most of the response  estimates  indicate  that 
there is already a high degree of displacement  for categorical  grants, 
implying  that those strings now on these grants to persuade states to 
spend  the grant  money are  relatively  ineffective.  Removing  these strings 
will not cause any great social losses,  but there will not be large 
improvements,  either. According  to the estimates  given here, there  will 
be relatively minor changes both in state-local public consumption 
purchases and utility levels as a result of the president's proposed 
changes. 
Conclusion 
This analysis suggests that some parts of Reagan's new federalism 
program  will  make  an  enormous  difference  on state-local  spending  levels, 
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involving  income-support  policies will make  a great  difference.  Increas- 
ing the marginal  cost of AFDC benefits  for all states will lower benefits 
because of the normal  price  effect, and  then lower  benefits  further  to the 
extent  that  state  responses  are  a function  of the uncoordinated  responses 
of other states. Decentralizing  food stamps would also greatly reduce 
combined benefits for recipients, if it is correct that states decide on 
AFDC levels independently  of food stamp  levels and  do not replace  any 
federal cutbacks. But one measure that appears to make very little 
difference,  at least on expenditure  levels, is the conversion  of categorical 
to block grants. The reason for this is that states already  appear  to be 
responding  to categorical  grants  with so much  freedom, or spending  so 
much  less than  the grant  provisions  require,  that  an elimination  of these 
strings  should  not  have  terribly  large  effects on either  public  consumption 
levels or state utility  levels. Comments 
and Discussion 
Henry J.  Aaron: Edward Gramlich  has made a valorous attempt to 
provide  convincing  estimates  of the effects on state welfare  spending  of 
President  Reagan's  proposal  to shift responsibility  for food stamps  and 
AFDC to the states in exchange for federal assumption of medicaid 
costs. If, in the end, I find  his estimates  unpersuasive,  it is more  because 
of the recalcitrance  of the data  with which  he is forced  to work  than  with 
any shortcomings  of his methods. 
Before turning  to his paper, it is useful to look back on the trends  in 
expenditures  with which he is concerned. Table 1 of these comments 
presents  information  on real  expenditures  in billions  of 1979  dollars  over 
1970-79  by both  federal  and state governments  under  AFDC, medicaid, 
food stamps, and supplemental  security income (SSI). The table also 
contains  information  on total  state  expenditures  for  selected  aggregations 
of assistance programs  and  for total state and  local spending. 
Table 1 reveals striking contrasts. Growth in total state spending 
slowed markedly  in the late 1970s  and reached a peak in 1978, as did 
state spending on welfare-type programs.  AFDC spending  reached a 
peak in 1976  and has been declining  since then. Expenditures  on food 
stamps  rose sharply  and without  interruption  during  this period,  largely 
because  the number  of recipients  increased.  Medicaid  expenditures  have 
risen  continuously,  mainly  because of rising  medical  costs. Both  federal 
and  state SSI expenditures  have declined  since 1976  because  of declines 
in the number of aged recipients only partly offset by growth in the 
number  of disabled beneficiaries  and because state supplements  have 
been permitted  to decline in real value. 
Table 2, compiled from the data in a paper by Richard  Kasten and 
John Todd, shows what has happened to average maximum  AFDC 
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Table  2.  AFDC  and  Food  Stamp  Benefits,  1969-79 
Dollars per month (1979 prices) 
Average  AFDC 
maximum  and  Food  stamps 
Year  AFDCa  food  stamps  (residual) 
1969  445  ...  ... 
1970  438  ...  ... 
1971  440  ...  ... 
1972  435  ...  ... 
1973  426  ... 
1974  414  520  106 
1975  403  511  108 
1976  398  500  102 
1977  391  486  95 
1978  380  477  97 
1979  361  478  117 
Source:  Richard  A.  Kasten  and John  E.  Todd,  "Transfer  Recipients  and  the  Poor  During  the  1970s,"  paper 
presented to the Second  Research  Conference  of the Association  of Public Policy Analysis and Management (Boston, 
October  1980). 
a.  Benefits  paid to recipients  with no outside  income. 
benefits  (that  is, benefits  paid  to recipients  with no outside income)  and 
to combined  food stamp  and  AFDC  benefits.  The  table  shows that  AFDC 
benefits  have fallen sharply  in real  terms, and  that  even after  food stamp 
benefits are added, the average maximum  payment  to families eligible 
for both programs  has declined. 
Under one interpretation,  the growth  of food stamps  has reduced  the 
perceived need for cash assistance and led states to reduce AFDC 
benefits. Under  this interpretation,  one need not look at other  aspects of 
welfare expenditures,  unless they too affect perceived needs of AFDC 
recipients  or  the overall  fiscal  position  of the state.  Gramlich  has  modeled 
this possibility and allowed the data to determine  the extent to which 
states let food stamps  substitute  for AFDC payments. 
There is another  interpretation  for what has been going on. For the 
past several years, states have been fiscally distressed. Under the 
multiple blows of  slowed economic growth and of tax expenditure 
limitations, which may reveal changes in voters' tastes about public 
spending, they have slowed the growth of public spending  in general, 
and  of redistributive  expenditures  in particular.  The increases  in medical 
costs, uncontrollable  by individual  states, have contributed  to medicaid 
claiming  an ever larger  share of state budgets. States could offset this 
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coverage. But states have been helped  by the acceleration  of inflation  to 
offset them indirectly  by letting fixed nominal  AFDC payment levels 
gradually  devalue. 
So one can view these trends as the rational, utility-maximizing 
response of states to the advent of a new federal  program,  from which 
one can infer the substitutability  of food stamps for cash benefits. Or 
one can view these trends as the disequilibrium  response of  state 
governments  to changes in prices, incomes, and preferences,  in which 
case nothing  can be inferred,  I think, about the substitutability  of food 
stamps  for cash benefits. 
Gramlich  has assumed the utility-maximizing  approach.  His model 
posits that the sum of an index of welfare  benefits  and  a multiple  of food 
stamp  benefits is gradually  moved by states toward  a desired  level that 
is a function  of mean  per capita  income in the state; the price  per dollar 
of AFDC  expenditures,  based  on the state  matching  share;  the  proportion 
of the state  population  that  received  benefits;  the level of welfare  benefits 
in surrounding  states and in the nation  as a whole; and  a vector of other 
variables. It is  unfortunate that the data limitations that Gramlich 
describes prevent him from adequately  modeling  medicaid  payments, 
which he indicates  he would, in principle,  include  in the utility  function 
and  which  I suspect  may  have  a lot to do with  total  state  welfare  spending. 
I return  to this below. 
The variable  used to specify the generosity  of state welfare  payments 
is a function  of the state's guarantee  at zero income and  the implicit  tax 
rates on earned and unearned income. One could quibble over this 
measure-for example, it contains no measure  of administrative  proce- 
dures  that affect take-up,  and  it is based on fixed values  for each state of 
the tax variables  and of earned  and unearned  income-but  I think  that, 
as a practical  matter, it would be rather  difficult  to make much of an 
improvement. 
The composite variable measuring the  subjective value to  state 
officials (or voters-the  utility-maximizing  unit is not altogether  clear) 
of the sum of AFDC and food stamp benefits depends on the weight 
assigned  to food stamps. Gramlich  obtains  an estimated  weight of zero 
in the regressions he prefers, but shows that an alternative  estimating 
equation  produces an estimate near 1.0. Thus he acknowledges  a good 
deal of uncertainty  in his estimates of this key parameter.  A simple  test 
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this parameter,  would be to use it to "backcast"-that  is, to predict 
AFDC  benefits  for earlier  years  than  are included  in the sample.  It might 
be necessary to use some period before the transition  to food stamps 
began. 
I believe that  there  is a more  basic problem  with  this model, however, 
one that emerges from an examination  of the way in which medicaid 
expenditures  enter the analysis. With  admirable  consistency, Gramlich 
develops a framework  within which some entity maximizes utility by 
paying AFDC plus food stamps to AFDC recipients, subject to a net 
income budget constraint. In this spirit, one is interested in knowing 
how much less such an entity will pay in cash plus food stamps  if these 
same beneficiaries  receive a certain  amount  of medicaid  benefits. 
As I indicated  above, Gramlich  does not  treat  medicaid  symmetrically 
with the  other benefit programs because the data are inadequate. 
Nonetheless, I believe some attempt  should  have  been  made  to introduce 
medicaid spending  into the estimation. If, as I suspect, the growth of 
total medicaid  costs has been a factor in heightening  sensitivity to the 
burden  of welfare broadly  defined, one needs to include some variable 
to take account of its growth. Lacking any more carefully crafted 
measure,  I would include state-financed  medicaid  expenditures  divided 
by total state population  as a reasonable  proxy. 
In addition,  however, if states have a notional  subbudget  for welfare- 
type expenditures, one would have to include the effects on state 
expenditures  of federal  assumption  of the state medicaid  share  in order 
to obtain a complete estimate of the effects of the Reagan  program  on 
state  welfare  outlays. Within  Gramlich's  framework,  it  would  be possible 
to measure  the effect on the state tax rate and, hence, on net income of 
reducing  state expenditures  on medicaid  to zero. 
A related difficulty  is the likelihood that preferences  have changed 
regarding  public expenditures  in general, and welfare or redistributive 
expenditures  in particular.  I know of no satisfactory  way to deal with 
this problem.  One is tempted  to suggest  the use of dummy  variables  for 
the enactment  of tax spending  limitation;  but  this approach  suffers  from 
problems too obvious to enumerate. Data in my table 1 document a 
significant  falling  off in state welfare-type  expenditures.  If preferences 
have changed significantly, a  serious shadow falls over the entire 
approach  in this paper. 
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in  benefit  levels, if one impounds  the effects of fears  of migration,  average 
a little over 50 percent, with suitable  diversity among  the states; but if 
the migration  perceptions,  on which the model is predicated,  come into 
play, benefits will be reduced by almost exactly the same, very high 
proportion  in every state. On the general principle  that there must be 
something  wrong  with  any model  that  predicts  all  fifty  states  will  respond 
to anything  in the same absolute amount  or in the same proportion,  I 
turn  to the final  section of the paper. 
It contains reestimates  of a model first  presented  several years ago. 
These estimates are used to estimate the effect of President  Reagan's 
proposal  first  to convert  most categorical  grants  to block  grants  and  then 
to eliminate them. I have no comments on this section, other than to 
express my regret  that results for public  assistance were not presented 
in addition  to those for public  consumption.  If they had  been presented, 
one could have compared  the estimates of the effect on welfare  expen- 
ditures  of the swap  of federal  assumption  of medicaid  costs from  the first 
part  of the paper  with results  from  this more  comprehensive  model. The 
federal assumption  of all medicaid  costs, in effect, is the reduction  of a 
categorical  grant  linked to an increase in general  revenue sharing.  The 
state assumption of the costs of AFDC and food stamps, in effect, 
eliminates  two categorical  grants. But since Gramlich's  tables 4 and 5 
report  results  only for public  consumption,  the reader  is prevented  from 
linking  up the first  and second parts  of the paper. 
I only wish that I found Gramlich's  econometrics  more persuasive, 
as he ends at a position I find most congenial, the judgment that the 
Reagan  initiative  will result in sizable reductions  in local expenditures, 
both as a result of incentive effects and because the cuts in spending 
outweigh the estimated utility gains from increased flexibility. Public 
debate should  focus on this effect of the proposed  initiative,  rather  than 
on the supposed tidying up of the responsibilities  of different  levels of 
government,  and Gramlich  characteristically  directs  us to keep our eye 
on the right  ball. 
Michael C. Lovell: Because it has been only eight months since Presi- 
dent Reagan  presented  his program  for the new federalism,  the analysis 
presented  in this paper obviously constitutes fast work. Nevertheless, 
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to be recognized in its own right as an important contribution to 
knowledge,  regardless  of the fate of the Reagan  proposals. 
To my mind, the most provocative  result  advanced  in this paper  has 
to do with  the strength  of the migration  effect on state-determined  benefit 
levels. Legislators  apparently  fear that  their states will be inundated  by 
an influx of recipients, and perhaps an outflow of taxpayers, if their 
welfare programs  are more generous than those of neighboring  states. 
The impact is summarized  in table 3. It presents estimates indicating 
that, if legislators  were not concerned  about  migration,  the elimination 
of federal  matching  for the aid for dependent  children  (AFDC)  program 
would result in benefit cutbacks averaging 56 percent; but because 
legislators  fear migration,  as Gramlich's  estimates say they do, AFDC 
benefits  will be almost eliminated.  This is a strong  conclusion  about  the 
consequences of a downward  spiral  of benefits  analogous  to oligopolistic 
price wars. Although  I am not convinced  by these estimates  for reasons 
I explain  below, I want  to emphasize  that  I am impressed  by Gramlich's 
demonstration  that  this conclusion  is compatible  with  the available  data. 
It may be worth noting  that Gramlich's  conclusion does not rely on 
an analysis of political  machinations,  such as the back-scratching  activ- 
ities and pressures of agricultural  interest groups  that have influenced 
the federal food stamp program.  And Gramlich  does not rely on an 
attempt to model the forces of single-issue voters on legislators, the 
incidence  of log-rolling  activities  in state  capitals,  and  so forth.  Nor does 
the analysis rest on an attempt  to measure  directly  the extent to which 
people actually migrate  from one jurisdiction  to the next in a quest for 
higher  welfare benefits. Further,  the perceptions  of politicians  are not 
measured  through  the use of survey techniques, which is just as well; I 
suspect that many legislators answering a poll would be inclined to 
emphasize migration  in attempting  to rationalize  niggardly  support  for 
welfare  programs,  whatever  the true  reason  for their  position. 
In deciding  whether  Gramlich's  conclusion should  be accepted, one 
must consider  the structure  of the model of the political  process that he 
uses and the appropriateness  of the variables he incorporates  in its 
empirical  implementation.  Gramlich  presents  evidence  on the variations 
in levels of state aid that result  from  differences  among  states in federal 
matching  rates for the AFDC program,  variations  in state income, case 
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is determined  by a "decisive voter" maximizing  his (or her) utility 
function.  The  decisive voter  plays  a role  as central  to Gramlich's  analysis 
as the "representative  firm" did to the analysis of Alfred Marshall. 
Perhaps the "decisive voter" is Harold Hotelling's "median voter"; 
perhaps  not. 
I believe that Gramlich's  estimates  may be biased  by the omission of 
a critical variable. My candidate  variable  comes from considering  the 
determinants  of the tax price paid by the decisive voter. If we were to 
work  through  the analysis  carefully,  I suspect  the tax price  will be found 
to depend  critically  on the ratio  of the decisive voter's income  to average 
income. If in fact the decisive voter is Hotelling's  median  voter, it is the 
ratio of median  to mean income that is critical.  This skewness variable 
has worked in my own research  on variations  among  school districts  in 
education expenditures;  I think a measure  of skewness of each state's 
income distribution  might  be even more important  in explaining  differ- 
ences in welfare  expenditures. 
It may also be important  in evaluating  state versus federal  financing 
to note that  state expenditures,  in addition  to direct  matching  from  Uncle 
Sam, are indirectly matched in the case of voters who itemize their 
deductions. Consider voters living in an average state who find them- 
selves in the 35 percent tax bracket. An increase of $1 in per capita 
spending  at the federal level will impose a $1 incremental  tax burden 
(ignoring  progressivity).  Although  a $1 increase  in expenditures  in these 
voters' home state will also result  in a gross increase  of state taxes of $1, 
35 cents of the dollar  will be offset by a reduction  in the federal  income 
tax due to the deductibility  of state and local taxes. The tax price paid 
by voters who itemize therefore may be only 65 cents of taxes per 
marginal  dollar  of state expenditure.  While  Uncle Sam  may  have to raise 
taxes to offset this loss of 35 cents, this is almost  negligible  at the margin 
for voters who itemize because it is  spread out among taxpayers 
throughout  the fifty states. While  it is true that only about  30 percent  of 
federal taxpayers itemize, which means that the "median taxpayer" 
takes the standard  deduction,  it is at least conceivable  that state legisla- 
tors, given their  own tax brackets,  may be more  attuned  to the interests 
of itemizing  taxpayers. Thus it seems to me at least conceivable that a 
relinquishment  of traditional  federal  responsibilities  to the states might 
raise total government  spending,  other  things  remaining  equal. 
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the effect of migration  perception  on legislators,  it is worth  thinking  a bit 
more about its possible consequences. First of all, I would not be 
surprised  if an evaluation  of the utility  function  underlying  Gramlich's 
analysis  revealed  that  the fall in average  AFDC  benefits  caused  a marked 
reduction  in the utility levels of the decisive voter in every state. If this 
is so, it is not necessarily  an argument  for federal  financing,  for it would 
be possible for states to  collude with their neighbors to  establish 
appropriate  benefit levels in order to avoid the migration  threat. In 
contrast  to oligopolistic  firms,  states are  free to collude without  the fear 
of antitrust  prosecution. And such collusion would be mutually  benefi- 
cial, not  just to the colluding  state legislatures  and  administrators,  but  to 
each state's "decisive voter" as well. 
Finally, I must mention  that in evaluating  the redistributional  impli- 
cations  of the Reagan  administration's  new federalism,  it is important  to 
consider more than the impact  of the proposed shift of responsibilities 
on the level of benefits  paid in the various  states, as in table 3. It is also 
necessary to consider the redistribution  of the financial  burden. For 
example, a wealthy state paying more taxes per capita to the federal 
government and receiving less in federal support than poorer states 
would find the self-financing  of AFDC relatively easy. To illustrate, 
Connecticut  had about 8 percent  of its school-age  children  living  below 
the poverty  level in 1975  while Mississippi  had  32.3 percent.  The  federal 
personal  tax burden  for Connecticut  residents  averages  about two and 
one-half  times the tax burden  for residents of Mississippi. Shifting  the 
financing  of the AFDC program  to the states will impose a heavy tax 
burden  on precisely those states that do not have an adequate  tax base 
to shoulder  the burden.  Not  just the poor, but  also the poorer  states have 
much  more  to lose than  the rich  from  the Reagan  proposals.  It would  be 
useful in evaluating the likely political future of the new federalism 
proposals  to know which states will gain  and which will lose. 
General Discussion 
George Perry disagreed with Michael Lovell's emphasis on the 
deductibility  of federal taxes. He reasoned that deductibility  did not 
change  Gramlich's  formulation  in an important  way because it would  be 
present  both before  and  after  the AFDC program  was turned  back  to the 370  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
states. If the median voter deducted his share of the state's welfare 
expenditures  before the reform,  he would  deduct  his share  of the state's 
presumably  higher  welfare  expenditures  after  the reform  as well. Lovell 
responded that Perry is assuming that voters at the state level were 
taking  responsibility  for these programs,  at least at the margin,  before 
the change in federal  financing.  If voters in fact view these programs  as 
a new responsibility  as a result of the change in financing,  then Perry's 
argument  would not be relevant. Joseph  Pechman  stressed a point that 
Lovell had passed over lightly:  the deductibility  of state and  local taxes 
is irrelevant  for the median  voter because the great  majority  of federal 
taxpayers  do not itemize deductions.  Roger  Gordon  pointed  out that  the 
voter's conception of tax cost might  be complicated  in a different  way. 
A  large share of  state and local revenues are raised by taxes on 
commercial  and industrial  property.  The median  voter may not regard 
himself as paying this portion of the tax. To the extent that different 
states have differing  amounts  of this type of property  to tax, the median 
voters across different  states may face substantially  different  tax prices 
of raising  AFDC benefit  levels. 
Alan Blinder  wondered  about the implications  of Gramlich's  results 
for  other  dimensions  of state  behavior.  Given  the  large  amount  of cyclical 
variability in economic conditions over the period under study, he 
suggested  that  states  facing  bad  economic  times  might  have  tried  to force 
poor people off welfare rolls. Gramlich  responded  that the coefficients 
on state  per  capita  income  and  unemployment  rates  did  show such  effects 
in state behavior. 
Michael  Wachter  observed that the most common  response of state 
and  local officials  to reduced  federal  funding  is not reductions  in benefits 
but greater stringency in applying eligibility criteria. This impact is 
terribly  difficult  to detect  using  the econometric  techniques  in  Gramlich'  s 
paper. He also expressed the belief that conservative political shifts 
have been occurring  at the state and local levels of government.  These 
too would  be hard  to detect econometrically  and  might,  for recent  years, 
be confused  in econometric  work  with  effects of reduced  income  growth 
or reduced  federal  support. 